Introduction to the Minitrack on Inside the Insider Threats by Clark, Jason et al.
 
 
Introduction to Inside the Insider Threat Minitrack 
 
 
 Jason W. Clark 






This year we have an exciting mini-track entitled “Inside the 
Insider Threat” planned for you. The mini-track will discuss 
the topic of insider threats which are a present and growing 
concern to organizations worldwide. This is due in large part 
because trusted employees have the capability for inflicting 
devastating consequences to their employer’s assets, data, 
and IT infrastructure, primarily because of their detailed 
knowledge and authorized access these systems. Any 
approach therefore must have not only a technical aspect, but 
also a non-technical (social, political, legal, cultural, and so 
forth) approach. Analyzing and detecting insider threats 
involve both technical and non-technical approaches across 
many different disciplines, including human-oriented ones. 
This mini-track accepted four papers emphasizing this cross-
cutting work in this exciting and important research area. 
 
The first paper is:  
Federated Platooning: Insider Threats and Mitigations 
 
Platoon formation is a freight organization system where a 
group of vehicles follows a predefined trajectory maintaining 
a desired spatial pattern. Benefits of platooning include fuel 
savings, reduction of carbon dioxide emissions, and efficient 
allocation of road. In this paper, the authors look at federated 
platooning from an insiders' perspective. First, they outline 
the basic elements of platooning and federation of platooning 
operators. Then, provide a comprehensive analysis to identify 
the possible insiders (employees, users, operators, and 
federated members) and the threats they pose. Finally, the 
authors propose two layered, composable technical solutions 
to mitigate those threats: 
 
1) a decentralized overlay network that regulates the 
interactions among the stakeholders, useful to mitigate issues 
linked to data safety and trustworthiness and   
 
(2) a dynamic federation platform, needed to monitor and 
interrupt deviant behaviors of federated members. 
 
The second paper is: 
Leader Member Exchange: An Interactive Framework to 
Uncover a Deceptive Insider as Revealed by Human 
Sensors 
 
This study intends to provide a theoretical ground that 
conceptualizes the prospect of detecting insider threats based 
on leader-member exchange. This framework specifically 
corresponds to two propositions raised by Ho, Kaarst-Brown 
et al. [42]. Team members that are geographically co-located 
or dispersed are analogized as human sensors in social 
networks with the ability to collectively “react” to deception, 
even when the act of deception itself is not obvious to any 
one member. Close interactive relationships are the key to 
afford a network of human sensors an opportunity to 
formulate baseline knowledge of a deceptive insider. The 
research hypothesizes that groups unknowingly impacted by 
a deceptive leader are likely to use certain language-action 




The third paper is: 
Modeling Expert Judgments of Insider Threat Using 
Ontology Structure: Effects of Individual Indicator 
Threat Value and Class Membership 
 
The authors describe research on a comprehensive ontology 
of sociotechnical and organizational factors for insider threat 
(SOFIT) and results of an expert knowledge elicitation study. 
The study examined how alternative insider threat 
assessment models may reflect associations among constructs 
beyond the relationships defined in the hierarchical class 
structure. Results clearly indicate that individual indicators 
contribute differentially to expert judgments of insider threat 
risk. Further, models based on ontology class structure more 
accurately predict expert judgments. There is some empirical 
evidence that other associations among constructs—such as 
the roles that indicators play in an insider threat exploit—
may also contribute to expert judgments of insider threat risk. 
Implications for research and practice are discussed. 
 
The final paper is: 
Connected Aircraft: Cyber-Safety Risks and 
Management Approaches 
 
The past several years has witnessed significant growth in 
Internet Protocol (IP)-based wireless connections between 
airborne aircraft, satellites, and terrestrial information 
systems, a phenomenon some have termed “The Connected 
Aircraft” (Bellamy, 2014).  Far eclipsing passenger high-
speed internet service, this movement is integrating 
thousands of embedded automated sensors connected to 
safety-critical systems, such as engines, flight controls, 
cockpit displays, and life support systems into the on-line 
infrastructure.  Airborne sensors continuously send data 




packets to worldwide airframe, engine, and avionics 
manufacturers, airline control centers, and third-party 
suppliers (Orjih, 2006).  The tremendous growth in the 
Internet of Things (IoT), small, low-power, programmable, 
internet-connected, smart devices, has accelerated the 
Connected Aircraft transformation (Lueth, 2014).  In short, 
winged local area networks are expanding the internet to 
30,000 feet. However, connecting aircraft to the internet is 
also exposing safety-critical airborne systems to serious 
cyber-physical safety risks, to which the traveling public is 
largely oblivious. This ignorance is likely to remain until, 
heaven forbid, a crash or other incident is directly linked to a 
successful cyberattack.  This research paper will attempt to 
narrow this knowledge gap by shedding light on the growing 
cyber-physical safety risks of The Connected Aircraft.  It will 
also suggest risk management approaches, some already 
underway, to help reduce these emerging cyber-safety risks 
so that the promising operational, economic, and business 
benefits of movement can be realized without exposing the 
traveling public to undue safety risk.
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